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The Dark Side of Interorganizational 






Scholars across management fields have paid increasing attention to the dark side of interorga-
nizational relationships. We first summarize the concept of the “dark side” and its manifesta-
tions in interorganizational relationships. We then map the main findings on the antecedents, 
consequences, and moderating factors of the dark-side manifestations. We relate research gaps 
to opportunities in our integrative framework. Furthermore, we present a research agenda to 
advance theory on the manifestation characteristics, the entities and their motivations, the tem-
porality issues, and the positive outcomes of dark-side manifestations.
Keywords: dark side; cooperative strategy; conflict; failure; opportunism; unethical prac-
tices; alliances, buyer-supplier; interorganizational relationships
Interorganizational relationships (IORs), such as alliances, buyer-supplier relationships, 
and R&D consortia, are central to economic activity. Alongside the widely reported benefits 
of IORs, which range from learning to tapping into resources (Cropper, Ebers, Huxham, & 
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Ring, 2008; Mesquita, Ragozzino, & Reuer, 2017), the dark side of IORs has received 
increasing attention across different management fields, such as business ethics, marketing, 
and supply chain management.
The term “dark side” has been broadly used to refer to the negative dimensions of IORs, 
which range from detrimental outcomes (Villena, Revilla, & Choi, 2011) to ill-intended 
behaviors (Narayanan, Narasimhan, & Schoenherr, 2015) or unethical practices (Carter, 
2000). In this review, we define the dark side of IORs as the set of generally damaging 
aspects of IORs; these aspects can be voluntary or involuntary and are generally driven by 
competence or integrity issues. Our approach excludes the IOR as a dark entity, such as car-
tels and mafia networks (Bertrand & Lumineau, 2016; Raab & Milward, 2003).
Several decades of research across management fields have revealed the importance of 
knowing more about the dark side of IORs (Abosag, Yen, & Barnes, 2016; Anderson & Jap, 
2005). Although IORs often experience dysfunctions and failure (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; 
Huxham & Vangen, 2000; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008), management scholars still have lim-
ited knowledge about these underlying dysfunctions and their consequences. The dearth of 
knowledge is due, to a large degree, to the absence of dialogue across management fields. We 
know little about the degree of advancement produced by prior research into the different 
aspects of the dark side of IORs. We thus propose an integrative review of the literature to 
address the following questions: What are the main manifestations of the dark side in IORs? 
What are the main drivers of these manifestations? Which factors moderate the relationship 
between the antecedents and manifestations of the dark side of IORs? What are the conse-
quences of the dark side? From our review, we suggest strategies to prevent and mitigate the 
detrimental and dysfunctional outcomes for organizations and IORs. More broadly, the study 
of the dark side represents an opportunity to extend our understanding of how IORs actually 
operate.
The lack of coherence of the theoretical and empirical evidence accumulated thus far 
makes it challenging to identify the main insights and shortcomings concerning the dark side 
of IORs. The term “dark side” is often used to refer to the trade-offs and tensions that emerge 
throughout IORs. As such, the existing reviews of the literature that explicitly refer to the 
dark side mostly study the “tipping point” above which a given construct is detrimental to 
organizations or the IOR as a whole. (In Supplemental Appendix 1, available online, we list 
the IOR-related research overviews that explicitly use the term “dark side.”) Extant over-
views of the literature focus, for instance, on the drawbacks of close relationships (Anderson 
& Jap, 2005) or trade-offs of trust in IORs (Zhong, Su, Peng, & Yang, 2017). A notable 
exception is a review of manifestations of the dark side of IORs by Johnsen and Lacoste 
(2016). However, their review focuses on buyer-supplier relationships in industrial market-
ing research; it neglects factors of the dark side studied in other types of IORs published 
across management fields. In parallel, a growing body of research studies the dark side of 
IORs as a phenomenon in its own right (Jap, 2003; Van de Vijver, Vos, & Akkermans, 2011). 
Indeed, considerations about the dark side of IORs feature at the core of widespread theoreti-
cal frameworks used in the study of IORs, such as opportunism in transaction cost economics 
(TCE), principal-agent conflict in agency theory, or unethical practices in the corporate social 
responsibility literature.
The objective of our integrative review is threefold. First, we aim to identify and synthe-
tize the main manifestations of the dark side of IORs. This literature remains a patchwork of 
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viewpoints perpetuated by silos among disciplines. For instance, the marketing literature 
emphasizes conflict in distribution channels (Dant & Schul, 1992), the business ethics 
research focuses on unethical practices (Ferrell, Hartline, & McDaniel, 1998), and the gen-
eral management research has long been concerned with opportunistic behavior (Poppo, 
Zhou, & Zenger, 2008). We bring together dispersed literature streams to gauge what we 
know about different manifestations of the dark side of IORs.
Second, we organize prior research into an integrative framework of the dark side of 
IORs. We provide a synthesis of the antecedents of the dark side of IORs. We also pay atten-
tion to research on the moderating factors in the relationship between specific antecedents 
and widespread manifestations of the dark side of IORs (ex ante moderators). Furthermore, 
our review insights extend to the consequences of manifestations of the dark side and the 
moderating factors (ex post moderators) of the manifestation-consequence relationship. 
Building on our synthesis of the literature, we discuss what specific fields can learn from 
each other as a way to address major conceptual shortcomings.
Finally, we present an agenda for future research about the dark side of IORs. We discuss 
research opportunities in four interrelated domains: manifestation characteristics, entities 
and their motivations, temporality, and the positive outcomes of dark-side manifestations.
Systematic Search of a Dispersed Literature
We now present the procedures used to search a literature dispersed across fields. In addi-
tion to building on the procedures used in prior reviews (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & 
Bagherzadeh, 2015; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011), we had to develop procedures that 
addressed challenges concerning the conceptual fragmentation and field-specific terminol-
ogy associated with the dark side of IORs. Supplemental Appendix 2 (available online) 
details the tasks carried out in each search step. Future researchers may find our approach 
useful in reviewing a dispersed literature on an ambiguous concept.
Step 1: Demarcation of the Concept of “Dark Side”
We first searched for reviews that used the term “dark side” applied to IORs. We then 
searched for conceptual and empirical articles that explicitly used the term “dark side” within 
the literature on IORs (total = 85 articles). Our list of keywords concerning IORs was based 
on Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos (2011: 1190). We established a variety of definitions and 
keywords associated with the dark side of IORs. We compared our list of words against con-
ceptual pieces (e.g., Vaughan, 1999) and the only systematic review of the dark side in the 
context of IORs (Johnsen & Lacoste, 2016). Our procedure captured what has been meant in 
the literature as the dark side, as opposed to arbitrarily choosing a particular definition.
Furthermore, we found that a set of descriptors of the dark side in IORs appeared across 
articles (e.g., opportunism and conflict). However, we also found a great diversity of descrip-
tors of the dark side of IORs, ranging from malfeasance to malpractice and misconduct. Such 
diversity reflects the multifaceted aspect of the phenomenon we studied. Nonetheless, it also 
posited concerns about the tractability of a systematic search of the literature. Using the key-
word “dark side” together with others keywords related to “IORs,” our initial search of the 
data set Business Source Elite yielded over 4,000 results.
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Step 2: Specification of the Review Scope
We felt an imperative to balance coverage, by specifying a list of journals across fields of 
research, and depth, by pursuing saturation of search terms concerning the dark side of IORs. 
First, we identified a list of top-tier journals that publish empirical, conceptual, or review 
articles. We specifically focused on top-tier journals in general management, accounting, 
business ethics, marketing, and supply chain management. This approach captured different 
treatments of the dark side of IORs across multiple fields of research.
Second, we addressed the challenge of conceptual fragmentation surrounding the dark side. 
We progressively built our list of search words based on reviews, conceptual and empirical 
articles, and definitions of the dark side until we reached saturation in the number of search 
results, that is, the inclusion of new words yielded only a few additional results. Table 1 shows 
how we built sets of search words. We implemented a set of search words that was inclusive of 
both different definitions and multiple forms concerning the dark side. With this approach, we 
took extra care to ensure that our search words retrieved relevant articles that may have used 
different terminologies across diverse management fields (e.g., marketing vs. business ethics).
Finally, we implemented two main criteria to identify relevant articles: (1) focus on IORs 
and (2) study of the dark side. Two coders independently coded each article for relevance on 
the basis of these criteria. We found strong intercoder reliability (.88; Cohen, 1960). The cod-
ers discussed and settled disagreements. We placed no date restriction on our search; our time 
window started in 1943 (first search result available in Business Source Elite) and ended in 
2017. In total, out of 825 initial results, the coders identified 178 relevant articles.
Manifestations of the Dark Side of IORs
We first examine the main findings about the manifestation of the dark side of IORs. The prior 
literature mainly studies manifestations of conflict, opportunism, and unethical practices. Figure 1 
shows the evolution of the number of articles according to the three most studied dark-side mani-
festations. The period between 1993 and 1997 is the first turning point: the dominance of the 
research on conflict is overtaken by the rapid growth of studies about opportunism in IORs, which 
is linked to the growing application of TCE to study IORs. After that period, we observe a steady 
interest in other manifestations of the dark side, particularly in unethical practices. In the period 
between 2013 and 2017, unethical practices emerge as the second most studied manifestation of 
the dark side of IORs. Overall, although there is a shift in the interest in specific dark-side mani-
festations, the set of the three most examined manifestations remains unchanged.
Together, articles about conflict, opportunism, and unethical practices represent 75.28% 
of the 178 reviewed articles on the dark side of IORs. (Below, we discuss studies that exam-
ine other dark-side manifestations.) Given its prominence, we first synthetize the literature 
on these three manifestations of the dark side. For each manifestation, we explore whether 
the articles focus on actual versus potential manifestations or whether they study the dark 
side as a single dimension versus multiple dimensions. Table 2 shows a typology of the mani-
festations of the dark side of IORs.
Conflict
Research on conflict in IORs examines instances of disagreement, clashes, lawsuits, or 
friction involving partners or individual representatives. One stream of this research 
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focuses on actual conflict by examining past and ongoing disagreements between partners 
or behaviors that are detrimental to the IOR (Lusch, 1976; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 
1998). Researchers often capture conflict in a single conceptual dimension (Antia, Zheng, 
& Frazier, 2013; Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014). As summarized in Table 2, studies that use 
Table 1
Saturation of Search Words: A Procedure for Ambiguously Defined Constructs
Word set Rationale Search words (abstract only) Results
1 To identify words that 
display a primarily 
negative valence and 
appear in the abstracts of 
literature reviews on the 
dark side of IORs.
“uncertain*” OR “conflict*” OR “opportunis*” 
OR “mishandl*” OR “discrimin*” OR 
“manipulat*” OR “neglect*” OR “unfair*” OR 
“dishonest*” OR “misuse” OR “trade-off*”
555 articles
2 To identify words that appear 
in core conceptual pieces 
about the dark side (e.g., 
Vaughan, 1999).
“uncertain*” OR “conflict*” OR “opportunis*” 
OR “mishandl*” OR “discrimin*” OR 
“manipulat*” OR “neglect*” OR “unfair*” 
OR “dishonest*” OR “misuse” OR “trade-
off*” OR “misconduct” OR “mistake” OR 
“disaster”
560 articles
3 To identify the words 
that display a primarily 
negative valence and 
appear in the abstracts of 
articles on the dark side of 
IORs.
“uncertain*” OR “conflict*” OR “opportunis*” 
OR “mishandl*” OR “discrimin*” OR 
“manipulat*” OR “neglect*” OR “unfair*” OR 
“dishonest*” OR “misuse” OR “trade-off*” 
OR “misconduct” OR “mistake” OR “disaster” 
OR “threat*” OR “declin*” OR “vulnerab*” 
OR “fail*” OR “disput*”
783 articles
4 To identify the words 
that display a primarily 
negative valence and 
appear in the definitions of 
the dark side of IORs.
“uncertain*” OR “conflict*” OR “opportunis*” 
OR “mishandl*” OR “discrimin*” OR 
“manipulat*” OR “neglect*” OR “unfair*” OR 
“dishonest*” OR “misuse” OR “trade-off*” 
OR “misconduct” OR “mistake” OR “disaster” 
OR “threat*” OR “declin*” OR “vulnerab*” 
OR “fail*” OR “destruct*” OR “destroy*” OR 
“distrust” OR “unethic*” OR “disput*”
823 articles
5 To identify synonyms of 
words in the set.
“uncertain*” OR “conflict*” OR “opportunis*” 
OR “mishandl*” OR “discrimin*” OR 
“manipulat*” OR “neglect*” OR “unfair*” OR 
“dishonest*” OR “misuse” OR “trade-off*” 
OR “misconduct” OR “mistake” OR “disaster” 
OR “threat*” OR “declin*” OR “vulnerab*” 
OR “fail*” OR “destruct*” OR “destroy*” OR 
“distrust” OR “unethic*” OR “delinquen*” 
OR “malfeasance” OR “malpractice” 
OR “malversation” OR “misdoing” OR 
“transgress*” OR “misdeed” OR “infringe*” 
OR “crim*” OR “lawlessness” OR 
“scandal” OR “unlawful” OR “devian*” 
OR “embezzle*” OR “wrongdoing” OR 
“misbehav*” OR “disput*”
825 articles
Note: Italics indicate the search terms added to each set. We entered the set of search words together with the list of 
journals and search words for interorganizational relationships (IORs).
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a single conceptual dimension focus on varied types of conflict, such as litigation (Antia 
et al., 2013), conflict ties (Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2014), or channel conflict (Schul, Pride, 
& Little, 1983).
Studies that capture multiple dimensions of conflict focus on the coexistence of emo-
tional conflict and task conflict (J. Li & Hambrick, 2005), disagreements between manu-
facturers and dealers (Lusch, 1976), and structural and operating conflicts (Molnar & 
Rogers, 1979). In particular, the literature on joint ventures emphasizes personality con-
flict and cultural conflict (Barden, Steensma, & Lyles, 2005) and emotional and task 
friction between IOR managers (J. Li & Hambrick, 2005). These studies stress the emo-
tional burden of conflict that arises from exchanges over issues about control, rent shar-
ing, priorities, and strategic decisions concerning an IOR (Frazier & Rody, 1991; Mo, 
Booth, & Wang, 2012).
Most of the research examines actual conflict; however, some studies also provide evi-
dence suggestive of potential conflict around issues of hostility (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 
1995) and prudence (Habib, 1987). This research prefers the study of multiple dimensions 
over single dimensions.
Conflict is largely studied in the fields of general management (24 out of the 46 arti-
cles on conflict) and marketing (12 out of 46 articles). Supply chain management and 
marketing studies primarily examine litigation and disputes in distribution channels (i.e., 
actual, single-dimension conflict). Researchers across research fields have yet to make 
inroads into the psychological aspects surrounding conflict (i.e., actual or potential, mul-
tiple-dimension conflict) experienced by managers working in IORs.
Figure 1
Research Output on the Main Manifestations of the Dark Side of Interorganizational 
Relationships (1943–2017)
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Opportunism
Studies of opportunism primarily build on TCE, which conceptualizes opportunism as 
self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975: 6). In addition to blatant forms of oppor-
tunism (e.g., lying, stealing, and cheating), recurrent forms of opportunism involve subtle 
modes of deceit and calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, or confuse (Williamson, 1985).
Table 2
Typology of the Main Manifestations of the Dark Side
Actual Potential
Conflict  
 Multiple dimensions Disagreements (conflict) between manufacturer and 
dealer across more than 20 issues (Lusch, 1976: 
384), emotional conflict & task conflict (J. Li & 
Hambrick, 2005: 803), latent conflict, manifest 
conflict & conflict resolution (Frazier & Rody, 
1991: 66), task conflict & relationship conflict 
(Mo, Booth, & Wang 2012: 124), structural 
conflict & operating conflict (Molnar & Rogers, 
1979: 408-409)
Conflict & hostility (Kumar, Scheer, 
& Steenkamp, 1995: 354), conflict 
& prudence (Habib, 1987: 816), 
perceived conflict captured using 23 
bipolar adjectives (Stern, Sternthal, & 
Craig, 1973: 175)
 Single dimension Buyer-supplier conflict (Bai, Sheng, & Li, 2016: 
22), conflict (Luo, Liu, & Xue, 2009: 1133; 
Steensma, Barden, Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Tihanyi, 
2008; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998: 148; 
Wilcox & Smith, 1977: 95), conflict tie (Sytch 
& Tatarynowicz, 2014), experienced parent 
conflict (Barden, Steensma, & Lyles, 2005: 163), 
intrachannel conflict (Schul, Pride, & Little, 1983: 
25), litigation (Michael, 2000), litigated conflict 
(Antia, Zheng, & Frazier, 2013)
N/A
Opportunism  
 Multiple dimensions Active & passive opportunism (Seggie, Griffith, 
& Jap, 2013: 88), provider shirking & provider 
poaching (Handley & Benton, 2012: 67)
Ex post opportunism & ex ante 
opportunism (Jap & Anderson, 2003: 
1697), information withholding & 
deviation from standards (El Akremi, 
Mignonac, & Perrigot, 2011: 948)
 Single dimension Exporter’s opportunism (Skarmeas, Katsikeas, 
& Schlegelmilch, 2002: 781), opportunism 
(Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006: 1076; Dahlstrom 
& Nygaard, 1999: 168; John, 1984: 288; Lado, 
Dant, & Tekleab, 2008: 423; Luo, 2007: 49), 
partner opportunism (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005: 
114), supplier opportunism (Morgan, Kaleka, 
& Gooner, 2007: 519), supplier opportunism 
(M. Wang, Zhang, Wang, & Sheng, 2016: 88), 
supplier opportunism (Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 
2003), perception of opportunistic behavior 
(Parkhe, 1993: 828)
Ex post opportunism (D. T. Wang, 
Gu, & Dong, 2013: 640), exchange 
partner’s opportunism (Heide, 
Wathne, & Rokkan, 2007: 432), 
opportunism (Kashyap, Antia, & 
Frazier, 2012: 275), supplier’s 
opportunism suspicions (Jap, 
2007: 158), potential opportunistic 
behavior (Tangpong, Hung, & Ro, 
2010: 412), threat of opportunism 
(Schilling & Steensma, 2002: 393)
Unethical practices  
 Multiple dimensions Deceitful practices (buyer), subtle practices (buyer), 
& supplier activities (Carter, 2000: 53)
N/A
 Single dimension Violation (Dawson, Karahanna, & Buchholtz, 2014: 
167), unethical practices (Ferrell, Hartline, & 
McDaniel, 1998: 511)
Salesperson’s moral judgment 
(Schwepker & Good, 2010: 614)
Note: We focused on the literature that uses scales of specific manifestations of the dark side as a way to support further research. 
Our categorization is indicative; some scales show a mix of items related to actual and potential behaviors.
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One strand of research examines actual opportunism as episodes of self-interested behav-
ior by at least one of the parties or its representatives (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; 
Kashyap, Antia, & Frazier, 2012; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). For instance, Carson et al. sur-
vey a manager’s agreement with a set of statements about past actions, such as “the contrac-
tor sometimes altered facts to get what it wanted” (2006: 1076). Evidence of actual 
opportunism is gauged by surveying managers about unfulfilled promises (John, 1984), abu-
sive behavior (Morgan, Kaleka, & Gooner, 2007), information withholding (Kashyap et al., 
2012), or strategic use of contractual loopholes (D. T. Wang, Gu, & Dong, 2013).
In line with the original conceptualization of opportunism in TCE (Williamson, 1975), 
opportunism is also studied as the likelihood of a counterparty’s behaviors of self-interest 
seeking. The concern relates to the counterparty’s potential opportunism, such as “bad faith” 
toward the partner (Jap, 2003), propensity to opportunism (Nooteboom, 1996), opportunistic 
intent (Lampel & Shapira, 2001), or threat of opportunism (Schilling & Steensma, 2002).
Most of what we know about opportunism is based on quantitative analyses, mainly using 
self-reported data (Handley & Benton, 2012; Jap & Anderson, 2003). Two qualitative excep-
tions are a study by Korczynski (1996), who draws on interviews with managers to learn 
about subtle opportunistic practices in the construction industry in the United Kingdom, and 
a study by Moretti and Zirpoli (2016), who report on interviews with managers working in 
the Venice Film Festival about suppliers’ opportunism and political tensions among parties. 
Qualitative studies suggest that opportunism is a nuanced dark-side manifestation, thus also 
calling for diversity of research methods.
Across research fields, opportunism is the most studied manifestation of the dark side of 
IORs (61 out of 178 articles in this review). Much of the research on opportunism appears in 
the fields of general management (35 articles), marketing (13 articles), and supply chain 
management (10 articles).
Unethical Practices
Unethical practices refer to ongoing activities of parties in the IOR who carry out actions 
considered morally wrong or improper. Prior research focuses on whether organizations dis-
play “preferential treatment” toward specific suppliers (Nguyen & Cragg, 2002), corporate 
research departments knowingly disseminate faulty conclusions (Ferrell et al., 1998), a part-
ner unilaterally decides to withdraw from the alliance (Bakker, 2016), or an organization 
consistently exploits its counterparty (Connelly, Miller, & Devers, 2012). A few studies also 
note the role of specific managers who display cynicism in their interactions with counterpar-
ties (Free, 2008), breach promises (Dawson, Karahanna, & Buchholtz, 2014), and act in ethi-
cally questionable ways against organizational guidelines (Saini, 2010).
The prior research mainly captures a single conceptual dimension of unethical practices 
(for an exception, see Carter, 2000; see Table 2). In contrast to studies on conflict and 
opportunism, the research on unethical practices examines multiple parties in a transac-
tion, such as buyers, suppliers, clients, and subcontractors. For example, Ferrell et al. 
(1998) show that corporate research departments, marketing research firms, and data sub-
contractors mutually influence one another’s unethical practices in the context of market-
ing research. Overall, prior research has made more progress in developing a multiparty 
perspective to study unethical practices than in theorizing the multiple conceptual dimen-
sions of these practices in IORs.
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We found very limited research on potential unethical practices by an organization or a 
manager (see Table 2). For instance, Schwepker and Good study salespersons’ moral judg-
ment (e.g., “I paint too rosy a picture of my products to make them sound as good as possi-
ble”; 2010: 621-622) under different scenarios in business-to-business sales. Managers’ 
moral judgment captures, to some extent, managers’ future behavior.
The research on unethical practices is concentrated in the field of business ethics; the lead-
ing journal in that field tops the number of articles (11 out of 27 articles about unethical 
practices). We found a growing interest in varied aspects of business ethics in journals of 
general management (10 out of 27 articles) and supply chain management (5 out of 27 
articles).
Discussion Points
First, the research on the manifestations of the dark side of IORs largely focuses on con-
flict, opportunism, and unethical practices. A few articles also study illegality (Agrawal, 
Cockburn, & Zhang, 2015), illegitimacy (Spitzeck, 2009), distrust and cynicism (Free, 2008), 
and misunderstandings (Thomas & Treviño, 1993). The prior literature displays greater con-
ceptual richness regarding the definition of the dark side of IORs—as shown in Table 1—
than in the set of manifestations captured in empirical analyses (i.e., conflict, opportunism, 
and unethical practices). This imbalance between theory and empirics may be due, in part, to 
the challenges of data access concerning the dark-side manifestations in IORs.
Second, different manifestations of the dark side are often measured in remarkably similar 
ways. As an illustration, Carter, who studies unethical practices in buyer-supplier relation-
ships, enquires whether buyers “use obscure contract terms to gain an advantage over suppli-
ers” (2000: 53); those terms share similarities with items used in measures of opportunism 
(e.g., “we will try to take advantage of ‘holes’ in our contract to further our own interests”; 
Heide, Wathne, & Rokkan, 2007: 432).
Finally, the focus on a specific manifestation of the dark side is desirable from the view-
point of tractability and parsimony. At the same time, the attention to a given dark-side mani-
festation is confined to specific research traditions. For example, studies that draw on TCE 
focus on opportunism while overlooking related aspects of conflict or unethical practices. 
The notion that IORs experience only one dark-side manifestation at a time is nevertheless 
problematic. The findings of in-depth studies in alliances are suggestive of the coexistence of 
conflict, perceived unfairness, and dysfunctional behaviors (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 
1996). In a given IOR, the dark side probably occurs as a “bundle of manifestations” in the 
sense that a set of dark-side manifestations may be tied together. We suggest that our knowl-
edge about the manifestations of the dark side will remain incomplete without systematic 
research that explores the consequences of the interplay between manifestations in terms of 
intensity, scope, and duration. For instance, a buyer’s perception of a supplier’s opportunism 
might contribute to conflict within the IOR, or task-related misunderstandings between the 
parties might be mistakenly perceived by one of the parties as opportunism on the part of the 
counterparty. It is also plausible that unethical behaviors by one party prompt conflict in the 
IOR, or perhaps more interestingly, ongoing conflict might prompt one party’s unethical 
practices intended at offsetting potential losses or obtaining revenge on the other party. 
Studies of the interplay between dark-side manifestations could explore how one specific 
manifestation might evolve or escalate to other manifestations.
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Furthermore, the interplay between actual and potential behavior remains a “black box” 
or at best, an area of confusion. Received wisdom provides little theorization of potential 
versus actual behavior. The research on opportunism pays considerable attention to potential 
behaviors, whereas the research on conflict and unethical practices is dominated by a focus 
on actual behaviors. Readers of past research often must inspect the measurement of the 
manifestation to determine whether the findings concern actual or potential behavior.
Antecedents, Consequences, and Context
We review the main findings about the antecedents, ex ante moderating factors, conse-
quences, and ex post moderating factors concerning the dark side of IORs. These aspects 
provide the infrastructure to our review that follows. Table 3 summarizes the reviewed litera-
ture. We underscore how the different aspects of the dark side are nested across levels of 
analysis.
Antecedents
A country’s formal and informal systems of regulations, values, and beliefs prompt the 
dark side of IORs. Much of the literature that has emphasized country-level factors builds on 
TCE (Antia et al., 2013; Luo, 2007). A key finding is that where law enforceability and the 
regulatory context are weak, managers are more likely to act in their own self-interest or 
extract advantages for their organization at the counterparty’s expense. Although less stud-
ied, religion may curb opportunism and unethical behavior by providing moral restraints on 
individuals (N. Li, 2008).
Industry volatility and industry-rooted practices are found to drive (potential) opportun-
ism among partners (Gu, Kim, Tse, & Wang, 2010; Korczynski, 1996; Zhou & Poppo, 2010). 
However, several studies also report a weak association between industry uncertainty and 
partners’ opportunism (Luo, 2007; Skarmeas, Katsikeas, & Schlegelmilch, 2002). Quantitative 
studies provide extensive, although inconclusive, evidence of the influence of industry 
uncertainty on opportunism in IORs. In-depth analyses further show that industry practices 
(Korczynski, 1996) and regional power politics (Moretti & Zirpoli, 2016) may perpetuate 
self-seeking behaviors.
An extensive line of research focuses on whether the formal aspects of the IOR, as well as 
the nature of the transaction, support or hinder manifestations of the dark side (see Table 3). 
The research on formal antecedents reports that contractual procedures influence the devel-
opment of opportunism and conflict (Barden et al., 2005; M. Wang, Zhang, Wang, & Sheng, 
2016). For instance, Bai, Sheng, and Li (2016) find that output-based contracts reduce buyer-
supplier conflict, while behavior-based contracts increase buyer-supplier conflict. The con-
tent of the contract (Heide et al., 2007; D. Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Zhou & Xu, 2012), 
governance regime (Antia et al., 2013; Carson et al., 2006), and partnering and organiza-
tional modes (Carter, 2000; John, 1984; Molnar & Rogers, 1979) delineate expectations and 
obligations between parties. Prior research on formal aspects largely concerns the role of 
control characteristics, such as narrow versus broad (Groot & Merchant, 2000), coercive 
versus noncohesive (Lusch, 1976), and bilateral versus quasi-hierarchical structure (Zhou & 
Xu, 2012), in the emergence of conflict and opportunism.
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Table 3
Literature on the Dark Side of Interorganizational Relationships: An Overview
Representative literature Synopsis Exemplars
Antecedents  
 Country level Antia, Zheng, & Frazier 
(2013); N. Li (2008); Luo 
(2007)
Weak law enforceability 
and regulatory context 
positively relate to 
opportunism, while 
religious factors limit 
opportunism.
Luo (2007) tests the 
positive effect of law 
unenforceability on 
opportunism.
 Industry level Carson, Madhok, & Wu 
(2006); Chung & Beamish 
(2010); Gu, Kim, Tse, & 
Wang (2010); Luo (2007); 
Moretti & Zirpoli (2016); 
Schilling & Steensma 
(2002); Zhou & Poppo 
(2010)
Industry/environmental 
uncertainty or volatility and 
industry-rooted practices 
are main drivers of 
(potential) opportunism. In 
technology collaborations, 
barriers to imitation, 
commercial uncertainty, and 




(2002) examine the 
direct, positive effect of 
environmental volatility 
on exporter’s opportunism 
(however, no support is 
found for the hypothesis).
 IOR level Formal: Barden, Steensma, 
& Lyles (2005); Heide, 
Wathne, & Rokkan 
(2007); M. Wang, Zhang, 
Wang, & Sheng (2016)
Informal: Lado, Dant, & 
Tekleab (2008); Lumineau 
& Oxley (2012); Wuyts & 
Geyskens (2005)
Transaction: Carter (2000); 
Handley & Benton (2012); 
Luo, Liu, & Xue (2009); 
Nooteboom (1996); Park 
& Ungson (2001)
The contract type and control 
mechanisms influence 
opportunism and conflict 
in IORs.
Relational norms and social 
ties—through mechanisms 
of social control—limit 
key manifestations of the 
dark side in IORs, such as 
conflict and opportunism.
Transaction-specific 
investments increase party’s 
exposure to opportunism; 
however, relationship-
specific investments might 
also operate as a mitigating 
factor.
Bai, Sheng, and Li (2016) 
study the extent to which 




Tangpong, Hung, and 
Ro (2010) find that 
relational norms mitigate 
opportunism in IORs.
Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 
(2003) show that the effects 
of specific investments 
on opportunism vary 




 Partner level Carter (2000); Ferrell, 
Hartline, & McDaniel 
(1998); Free (2008); 
MacDonald & Chrisp 
(2005); Mo, Booth, & 
Wang (2012); Terpend, 
Tyler, Krause, & 
Handfield (2008)
Partner’s characteristics, 
practices, and management 
tools contribute to the 
manifestation of, for 
example, conflict and 
unethical practices in IORs.
Schul, Pride, and Little 
(1983) report that 
franchisor’s leadership 
style based on 
participation and support 
reduces intrachannel 
conflict.
 Individual level Bayou, Reinstein, & 
Williams (2011); Dawson, 
Karahanna, & Buchholtz 
(2014); Faerman, 
McCaffrey, & Van Slyke 
(2001); Griffin (2014)
Individuals’ predispositions 
and perceptions influence 
the manifestation of the 
dark side of IORs.
El Akremi, Mignonac, 
and Perrigot (2011) 
show that manager’s 
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Representative literature Synopsis Exemplars
Ex ante moderators  
 Country level Bai et al. (2016); Luo 
(2007); Zhou & Poppo 
(2010)
Perceived legal enforceability 
and dependence on 
the local market might 
weaken or strengthen 
the relationship between 
country-level antecedents 
and manifestations of the 
dark side of IORs.
Bai et al. (2016) study 
the extent to which 
government support of 
the buyer influences the 




 Industry level Agrawal, Cockburn, & 
Zhang (2015); Ariño & 
de la Torre (1998); Assael 
(1968); Carson et al. 
(2006); Heidl, Steensma, 
& Phelps (2014); Lampel 
& Shapira (2001)
Industry characteristics 
(e.g., market dynamics, 
structure, and norms) might 
weaken or strengthen 
the relationship between 
country-level antecedents 
and conflict or opportunism 
(less is known about 
unethical practices).
Luo (2007: 53) reports that 
the interaction between 
industry growth and 
law unenforceability is 
significant and negative 
in relation to both foreign 
and Chinese parties’ 
opportunism.
 IOR level Formal: Antia et al. (2013); 
Chung & Beamish (2010); 
Hambrick, Li, Xin, & 
Tsui (2001); Lyles & Salk 
(2007)
Informal: Heide et al. 
(2007); Lado et al. (2008); 
Moretti & Zirpoli (2016); 
Nicholls & Huybrechts 
(2016); D. T. Wang, Gu, 
& Dong (2013)
Transaction: Dant & Schul 
(1992); Lumineau & 
Oxley (2012); Stump & 
Heide (1996)
Governance structure and 
formalization of business 
practices moderate the 
relationship between partner 
and individual antecedents 
and the dark side of IORs.
Trust, cooperative norms, 
cocreation of common 
rules, and social ties among 
partners are amongst the 
most common moderating 
factors.
A few studies examine the 
nature of the transaction 
as a moderating factor, 
particularly for the 
manifestation of conflict.
Antia et al. (2013) argue 
that whether franchise 
regulations ratchet conflict 
up or down depends, for 
example, on ownership 
type.
Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) 
show that the effect of 
detailed contracts on 
mitigating opportunism is 
less effective under low 
network embeddedness.
Barden et al. (2005) report 
that when the foreign 
parent company has to 
contribute few technical 
resources, local parent 
operational control 
reduces conflict.
 Partner level Barden et al. (2005); 
Daboub & Calton (2002); 
Robinson, Tuli, & Kohli 
(2015); Stump & Heide 
(1996); D. T. Wang 
et al. (2013); Wuyts & 
Geyskens (2005)
Partner’s size, monitoring 
capability, culture, and area 
of competence moderate 
the relationship between 
conflict and opportunism.
Wilcox and Smith (1977) 
report that small companies 
regard an auditor as 
playing a wider variety of 
roles (e.g., consultant vs. 
police officer) than large 
firms, which contributes to 
conflict.
Consequences  
 IOR level Ariño & de la Torre (1998); 
Claasen & Roloff (2012); 
Park & Ungson (2001); 
Singh & Mitchell (1996)




dissolution and ailing 
relationships.
Huang, Luo, Liu, and Yang 
(2016) argue that conflict 
leads to ailing relationship 
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Representative literature Synopsis Exemplars
 Partner level Hill, Eckerd, Wilson, & 
Greer (2009); Kaynak 
& Sert (2012); Larsson, 
Bengtsson, Henriksson, & 
Sparks (1998); Lumineau 
& Malhotra (2011); Luo 
(2007)
Current research primarily 
emphasizes weak financial 
performance, low 
satisfaction, and reduced 
value captured from other 
partners.
Dahlstrom and Nygaard 
(1999) examine the 




 Individual level Morris et al. (1998) The choice of conflict 
resolution strategies varies 
according to managers’ 
nationality.
No clear exemplar study.
Ex post moderators  
 IOR level Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, 
& Simpson (1992); Dant 
& Schul (1992); Free 
(2008); Huang et al. 
(2016); Jap & Anderson 
(2003); Lin & Germain 
(1998)
Governance arrangements, 
conflict resolution tactics, 
level of dependence, and 
perceived goal alignment in 
the IOR reportedly operate 
as ex post moderators.
Kaynak and Sert (2012) 
show how communication 
moderates the impact of 
unethical behavior on 
partner satisfaction.
 Partner level Agrawal et al. (2015); 
Schwepker & Good 
(2010); Sullivan, Peterson, 
Kameda, & Shimada 
(1981)
Partner’s nationality, 
munificent resource base, 
and perceived risk are ex 
post moderators.
No clear exemplar study.
 Individual level Dawson et al. (2014); 
Huang et al. (2016); 
Nygaard & Dahlstrom 
(2002)
Personal ties, expectations, 
and individual’s role 
conflict operate as ex post 
moderating factors.
No clear exemplar study.
Note: IOR = interorganizational relationships.
Table 3 (continued)
Informal aspects curb manifestations of the dark side of IORs (Boyle, Dwyer, 
Robicheaux, & Simpson, 1992; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Personal relationships among 
managers promote social control (Saini, 2010), solidarity (Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 
2003), and norms of cooperation (Lumineau & Oxley, 2012) while reducing conflict, 
opportunism, and unethical practices (Kennedy & Lawton, 1993; Martínez, 2003). Drawing 
together TCE, personality traits, and contingency theories, Tangpong, Hung, and Ro (2010) 
find that values and shared priorities limit opportunism between exchange partners. 
Communication procedures promote goal congruence and frame alignment (Nygaard & 
Dahlstrom, 2002), particularly in IORs with diverse partners, as seen in cross-sector part-
nerships (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010). These studies illustrate that the nuanced nature of dark-
side manifestations calls on researchers to integrate different yet complementary theoretical 
approaches.
The literature on interorganizational governance shows that the nature of the transaction 
influences the manifestations of the dark side in IORs (Handley & Benton, 2012; Luo, Liu, 
& Xue, 2009; Nooteboom, 1996; Rokkan et al., 2003; Saini, 2010). This literature mainly 
builds on TCE, which might explain the focus on opportunism over other dark-side manifes-
tations in IORs. For example, Rokkan et al. (2003) provide interesting findings in that while 
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TCE research predicts that specific investments place the partner in a vulnerable position to 
the counterparty’s opportunistic behavior, they suggest that specific investment might bond 
the parties (see Table 3). According to their study, such a bonding effect is expected to occur 
when the focal relationship’s time horizon is long and strong solidarity norms are in place. 
The main finding of Rokkan et al. is that specific investments increase one party’s vulnerabil-
ity and augment the power differences within the IOR.
Taking a more granular view, other studies focus on partner and individual characteristics. 
Partners’ low perceived personality dissimilarity (Mathews, Wilson, & Monoky, 1972) and 
high cultural sensibility, such as the understanding of domestic business practices (Skarmeas 
et al., 2002), reduce conflict and opportunism. Prior research largely discusses the role of 
communication and the formation of unspoken rules in the reduction or prevention of con-
flict, while social control operates to curb opportunism. Partners’ beliefs about the purpose of 
the IOR (MacDonald & Chrisp, 2005), trading practices (Carter, 2000; Terpend, Tyler, 
Krause, & Handfield, 2008), knowledge diversity (N. Malhotra, 2003), and corporate leader-
ship styles (Mo et al., 2012) have a bearing on unethical practices and conflict. For instance, 
a study by Schul et al. (1983) finds that a franchisor’s leadership style that is perceived to 
emphasize participation, support, and direction in channel activities significantly reduces 
intrachannel conflict. The business ethics literature pays particular attention to partners’ 
training and codes of conduct in preventing unethical practices (Claasen & Roloff, 2012; 
Free, 2008; Halter, Arruda, & Halter, 2009). In a study of U.K. supermarkets, Free (2008) 
shows how supermarkets’ purchasing managers pursue self-interested actions under the label 
of “management efficiency,” which results in distrust and cynicism between supermarkets 
and their suppliers. This study shows the importance of analyzing how actors develop narra-
tives about the prevention of unethical practices that in fact are intended to tighten control 
over other parties in the IOR.
At the individual level, El Akremi, Mignonac, and Perrigot (2011) report that a manager’s 
perceived strong social cohesion among franchisees reduces information withholding and 
deviation from franchising chain standards. Research on individual-level antecedents of 
dark-side manifestations mainly shows that opportunism and conflict in IORs is rooted in 
managers’ limited willingness to trust (Zaheer et al., 1998), low disposition to cooperate 
(Faerman, McCaffrey, & Van Slyke, 2001), or breach of the psychological contract (Dawson 
et al., 2014). At the same time, research on unethical practices foregrounds managers’ judg-
ment (Griffin, 2014) and moral values (Bayou, Reinstein, & Williams, 2011) to enable the 
individual to probe managerial practices. The literature on individual-level antecedents of 
conflict and opportunism differs from the literature on unethical practices in the sense that 
the latter ascribes considerable agency to individuals to question and decide to pursue actions 
commonly viewed as dark side.
Manifestations of the dark side are often prompted by trade-offs that characterize the 
management of IORs (Das & Teng, 2000; Uzzi, 1996). Trade-offs may be represented as an 
inverted curvilinear effect with an optimal level beyond which a construct with a traditionally 
positive valence (e.g., trust or information sharing) becomes detrimental for the IOR. Past 
research mainly focuses on the linkage between IOR governance and the likelihood of oppor-
tunism and conflict (Huemer, 2004; Lumineau, 2017; Vlaar, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 
2007). The roles of trade-offs as drivers of unethical practices have yet to benefit from future 
theorizing.
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Ex Ante Moderators
A scattered but growing literature examines the factors that mitigate or exacerbate the 
relationship between specific antecedents and particular dark-side manifestations. We call 
these factors ex ante moderators (see Table 3). At the national level, past research examines 
the moderating role of high perceived legal enforceability and high dependence on the local 
market in the relationship between antecedents and conflict (Bai et al., 2016) and opportun-
ism (Luo, 2007). In a study of buyer-supplier relationships in China, Bai et al. (2016) report 
that the interplay between contractual control and legal enforceability reduces conflict, 
whereas the interplay between contractual control and unilateral government support 
increases it.
Industry characteristics are the most studied moderators of the relationship between coun-
try-related antecedents and conflict or opportunism (Assael, 1968; Carson et al., 2006; Heidl, 
Steensma, & Phelps, 2014; Lampel & Shapira, 2001; Villena, Choi, & Revilla, in press). For 
instance, Luo (2007: 53) finds a significant and negative interaction between industry growth 
and law unenforceability in predicting foreign and Chinese parties’ opportunism. Prior stud-
ies converge toward the idea that industry’s idiosyncratic rules and values (Lampel & Shapira, 
2001; Luo, 2007) and patterns of interaction among firms in the industry (Heidl et al., 2014) 
may not only mitigate but also exacerbate the relationship between the antecedents of the 
dark side and its manifestations.
Like the research on antecedents, studies on ex ante moderators primarily focus on IOR-
level factors. For example, the extent to which franchise regulations ratchet conflict up or 
down depends on the extent to which franchisors rely on franchisee-owned units (Antia et al., 
2013). Other formal moderators include governance structure (Boyle et al., 1992; Kivleniece 
& Quélin, 2012), shared control versus split control (Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001), and 
franchising type (Barthélemy, 2008).
Researchers also study informal ex ante moderators; these include trust (Lado, Dant, & 
Tekleab, 2008), common rules (Nicholls & Huybrechts, 2016), network dynamics (Moretti 
& Zirpoli, 2016), social ties among partners (D. T. Wang et al., 2013; Wuyts & Geyskens, 
2005), and social contracts (Heide et al., 2007). In a study of purchase decisions made by 
838 small-to-medium-sized firms in The Netherlands, Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) report 
that the effect of detailed contracts on mitigating opportunism is less effective under low 
network embeddedness (i.e., few ties among suppliers and their partners). This study is 
particularly interesting because it provides a rare combination of TCE and social network 
theory in an attempt to coalesce economic and sociological perspectives to advance theory 
on opportunism.
Issues of asymmetric power between partners (Assael, 1968; Dant & Schul, 1992) and 
specific investments made by one of the parties (Stump & Heide, 1996) in the context of the 
transaction are also studied as ex ante moderators in addition to being tested as antecedents 
of dark-side manifestations. In the context of international joint ventures, Barden et al. 
(2005) find that the local parent’s operational control reduces conflict when the foreign par-
ent is required to contribute few technical resources. This study suggests the importance of 
accounting for the coordination needs and type of resources in specific IORs as a way to 
develop generative knowledge about the mitigating factors of opportunism, as well as other 
manifestations.
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We found only a handful of studies on partner characteristics. In a study of auditor-client 
relationships, Wilcox and Smith (1977) suggest that small companies, more than large firms, 
report that the auditor fills a wide variety of roles (e.g., consultant vs. police officer). They 
then report that these discrepancies account for different levels of conflict between the par-
ties. Other partner-level ex ante moderators include partner’s size (Robinson, Tuli, & Kohli, 
2015), ability to evaluate counterparties (Stump & Heide, 1996), monitoring capability (D. 
T. Wang et al., 2013), area of competence (Daboub & Calton, 2002), uncertainty avoidance, 
collectivism, and power distance (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). The examination of partner-
level ex ante moderators has yet to result in a coherent set of theoretical insights.
The diversity of partner-level ex ante moderators is in stark contrast to the lack of studies 
about individual-level factors that may moderate the relationship between the antecedents 
and manifestations of the dark side of IORs. Current theory provides little insight into the 
role of managers in mitigating or exacerbating the dark-side manifestations in IORs. This 
situation thus represents an opportunity for individual-oriented perspectives to complement 
existing theory.
Consequences
IORs are touted as a fundamental strategy to attain competitive advantages. However, 
manifestations of the dark side contribute to ailing relationships between partners (Huang, 
Luo, Liu, & Yang, 2016; J. Li & Hambrick, 2005) and in extreme cases, to failure (Ariño & 
de la Torre, 1998; Bakker, 2016).
As far as the dark-side literature is concerned, the failure or unplanned dissolution of an 
IOR often follows conflict, behavior that is perceived to be opportunistic, or a dysfunctional 
governance structure in the face of coordination and control needs in the IOR (for a discus-
sion of alliance failure, see Park & Ungson, 2001). The typical case of failure occurs when, 
for example, an alliance ceases activity without fulfilling the objectives that were agreed 
upon between parties (Bakker, 2016).
In addition to failure of the IOR, conflict and opportunism are found to damage the rela-
tionship between partners even if cessation of operations or disintegration of the IOR team 
does not occur (Huang et al., 2016; J. Li & Hambrick, 2005). Opportunism is linked to reduc-
tions in relationship performance (Barthélemy, 2008; Lado et al., 2008) and satisfaction with 
the relationship (Jap, 2003). In a study of conflict, Huang et al. (2016) provide an interesting 
argument about how conflict prompts ailing relationship quality by weakening commitment, 
satisfaction, and trust. This study makes the case for studying nonfinancial consequences. In 
fact, analyses of the eroding qualitative aspects of the relationship would provide unique 
insights into the underlying social processes of the manifestation-consequence linkage. In 
our examination of past research, we found no study that directly examines the extent to 
which specific unethical practices bring about negative consequences for the IOR.
Research on the dark side is also concerned with consequences for partners. From a finan-
cial viewpoint, Luo (2007) shows that joint venture partners’ opportunism decreases their 
own financial returns and sales growth. Drawing on the TCE assertion that opportunism 
increases transaction costs, Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) uncover that partners incur addi-
tional costs following opportunistic behaviors or unethical behavior by their counterparties 
(Kaynak & Sert, 2012; Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011). More generally, research shows that 
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the manifestation of the dark side of IORs reduces the partner’s extracted value. Members 
often become less involved, such that a partner underachieves with regard to the fulfillment 
of strategic needs (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010) and experiences limited knowledge acquisition 
(Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998; Lyles & Salk, 2007).
We found limited IOR literature on the consequences of the dark side for individuals, such 
as stress and dismissal. We found only a study of a failed collaboration between a university 
and the Department of Public Welfare, which reports that the managers worried about their 
dismissal (Sebring, 1977). Our search of the literature suggests that we know little about the 
consequences for managers who, for example, pursue opportunistic practices in dealing with 
their counterparties.
The prior research focuses on how to suppress the negative consequences of the dark side 
or strategies that reduce the consequences to a level that is tolerable by the parties. In con-
trast, a few studies in our review directly examine the trade-offs surrounding the link between 
the manifestations and consequences of the dark side (see Table 3). For instance, Michael 
notes that “conflict on a particular issue may be bad, but compromise may be possible within 
the adaptive range, with tradeoffs made in other areas” (2000: 508). The notion of an “adap-
tive range” suggests that managers can make choices that might either mitigate or exacerbate 
the consequences of dark-side manifestations. We found no article that clearly examines the 
processes, decision-making, and paradoxes regarding the linkage between the manifestations 
and consequences of the dark side.
Ex Post Moderators
We found a handful of studies showing that the formal and informal aspects of the IOR 
mitigate the consequences of the dark side (Dant & Schul, 1992; Free, 2008). With regard to 
the formal aspects of IORs, the current research examines specific resolution strategies (Lin 
& Germain, 1998; Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011) and governance structures (Boyle et al., 
1992) aimed at reducing conflict or litigated action between partners.
At the same time, informal aspects within the IOR might also operate as buffers against 
the consequences of unethical practices. In a study of 260 pharmacies in Turkey, Kaynak and 
Sert (2012) suggest that effective communication has a moderating effect on the impact of 
suppliers’ unethical practices on buyer satisfaction. In addition to communication, other 
informal buffers include the perceived alignment of business goals, in the link between 
opportunistic behavior and continuity of the relationship (Jap & Anderson, 2003), and discur-
sive practices between the parties, in the link between self-interested actions and cynicism 
and distrust (Free, 2008).
A partner’s nationality (Sullivan, Peterson, Kameda, & Shimada, 1981), resource base 
(Bakker, 2016), organization type (Agrawal et al., 2015), customer orientation (Schwepker 
& Good, 2010), and perceived risk (Gu et al., 2010) are indicated as ex post moderating fac-
tors. In the context of international joint ventures between American and Japanese firms, 
Sullivan et al. conclude that “Japanese managers perceive a higher level of future trust when 
disputes are resolved through conferral [i.e., discussion], except when an American is in 
charge of operations” (1981: 803). Although conducted over 30 years ago, this study is still 
the exception in the research on partners’ cultural background as an ex post moderator in the 
analysis of the dark side of IORs.
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Individual-level aspects—such as personal ties and expectations—are shown to play a 
moderating role in the relationship between dark-side manifestations and the consequences 
of such manifestations (Morris et al., 1998; Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 2002). Social ties support 
information processing and contribute to reducing ambiguity, particularly during the turbu-
lent periods of IORs that are characteristic of conflict between partners. Individual organiza-
tional citizenship behaviors (Dawson et al., 2014) operate as buffers against the negative 
impact of a supplier’s unethical practices on a buyer’s satisfaction. However, we found a 
general dearth of research examining individual-level ex post moderating factors. This pro-
vides opportunities for dialogue among research fields to develop analyses of the individual 
aspects that underpin the dark side of IORs.
Muddling Through Research Fields: Actionable Research Steps
The above integrative framework aids us in identifying key shortcomings that have devel-
oped across research strands on the dark side of IORs. These shortcomings present immedi-
ate opportunities (“low-hanging fruits”) for cross-fertilization between the fields of general 
management, accounting, business ethics, marketing, and supply chain management. Table 4 
provides examples of the benefits of further dialogue between research streams.
Manifestations and Types of IORs
The literature devotes substantial attention to opportunism in alliances and buyer-supplier 
relationships (44 out of 178 articles). First, we acknowledge the importance of widening the 
set of manifestations of the dark side. For example, further studies on supply chain manage-
ment might draw on business ethics to explore the erosion of legitimacy in buyer-supplier 
relationships by examining how different audiences attribute, deny, or remove legitimacy to 
or from an IOR. Other studies may leverage accounting studies of illegal management prac-
tices to advance theory on the extent to which governance controls may unintendedly support 
the emergence of illegal practices. We call for research on the dark side of IORs that analyzes 
the distribution of gains and losses as a way to understand whether the dark side usually oper-
ates as a zero-sum game. We know little about how the different manifestations of the dark 
side affect each partner differently in an IOR (Lumineau & Oliveira, 2018). Such studies may 
connect, in particular, with research on value creation and value distribution in IORs 
(Mesquita et al., 2017; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010).
Second, we call for research that goes beyond buyer-supplier relationships (77 out of 178 
articles) and alliances (38 out of 178 articles). The current knowledge remains restricted to a 
set of IORs that falls short of the diversity of IORs, such as cross-sector partnerships, net-
works, trade associations, and R&D consortia. It is plausible that some types of IORs are 
more affected by specific dark-side manifestations. However, current research provides lim-
ited insights into how structural and purpose differences among IORs influence the underly-
ing processes of dark-side manifestations or the buffering factors concerning the dark side.
Antecedents and Manifestations
Prior research emphasizes industry and IOR factors that trigger opportunism and conflict. 
Future research should seek a dialogue among research fields to tap into the multiple-level 
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nature of the antecedents of the manifestations of the dark side of IORs (see Table 4). General 
management can help researchers to examine whether the dark side is initiated by workers or 
is, instead, encouraged by managers at the top of an organization or by the top management 
of the IOR. Marketing and supply chain management researchers may draw on their knowl-
edge of marketing channel characteristics and licensing agreements to study the extent to 
which the content of formal agreements influences individual behavior in specific ways that 
limit or promote the dark side (see Table 4). For example, the unethical practices observed 
under specific governance agreements might actually be incentivized or tolerated by 
Table 4
Research Opportunities Across Fields of Research














Type of IOR Buyer-supplier
Alliance
Buyer-supplier












 Multilevel analysis e.g., to examine the 
organizational 
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characteristics of the 
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diffusion of unethical 
practices
e.g., to study when 
partners’ perceived 
importance of the 











as burnout and 
distress
e.g., to assess how 
partners’ unethical 
practices erode 
credibility in the 
marketplace
e.g., to unpack the 
underlying processes 
by which audiences 
marginalize 
perpetrators of the 
dark side
e.g., to study how 
franchisor’s 
practices commonly 
understood as the 
dark side influence 
potential franchisees’ 
decision to join
e.g., to evaluate the 





from wishing to 
collaborate
Ex post moderators  
 Buffering 
mechanisms
e.g., to study how 
third parties may 
play a conciliatory 
role between the 
parties
e.g., to assess the 
role of control 
in mitigating the 
consequences of the 
dark side
e.g., to unravel the 
processes and 




e.g., to study the extent 




e.g., to study the 
moderating role of 
boundary spanners 
to minimize 
consequences of the 
dark side
Note: We have approximated the fields of research based on outlets in our review. The outlet-field match is as follows: general 
management (The Academy of Management Annals, Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, International Journal of Management Reviews, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal 
of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Management Science, Organization Science, Organization Studies, and Strategic 
Management Journal); accounting (Accounting, Journal of Accounting Research, and Organizations & Society); business ethics 
(Journal of Business Ethics); marketing (Journal of Marketing and Journal of Marketing Research); and supply chain management 
(Journal of Operations Management and Journal of Supply Chain Management). IOR = interorganizational relationship.
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management teams. Here, the literature on business ethics might prove particularly useful in 
studying the role of contextual aspects in supporting practices commonly viewed as unethi-
cal. Furthermore, the accounting research on white-collar crimes and misconduct by indi-
viduals would help to elucidate the psychological characteristics of perpetrators of specific 
manifestations of the dark side, such as illegality and illegitimate practices.
Ex Ante Moderating Factors
The interplay between formal and informal aspects of IORs has received limited attention 
in the literature on ex ante moderating factors. Future dialogue across research fields is 
needed to explore the organization- and individual-level factors that mitigate specific dark-
side manifestations (see Table 4). We still know little, for example, about the organizational 
and individual characteristics that can help mitigate conflict in IORs (Lumineau, Eckerd, & 
Handley, 2015).
We suggest that general management should draw on the literature on boundary spanners 
to examine the extent to which the leadership style of those managers working across orga-
nizational boundaries operates as a buffer against misconduct in IORs. Marketing studies can 
take advantage of research on franchising agreements to determine the extent to which spe-
cific characteristics of the franchising network and the franchisor mitigate or, on the contrary, 
exacerbate the diffusion of specific misbehaviors. Further knowledge about ex ante modera-
tors may be pursued by supply chain management researchers who study partners’ percep-
tions of the importance of the IOR. These perceptions provide an opportunity to expand our 
current knowledge into temporal aspects that might operate as ex ante moderators of the dark 
side of IORs. Accounting researchers may explore whether formal training in accounting-
related topics weakens or strengthens the relationship between market conditions and illegal 
accounting practices that aim to deceive stakeholders. Other studies, especially in business 
ethics, may focus on managers’ religious and ethnic affiliations as individual-level ex ante 
moderators.
Manifestations and Consequences
Prior research has largely studied consequences in terms of failure of the IOR and finan-
cial costs for partners. A few studies examine the intangible consequences for partners and 
the IOR, such as partners’ low engagement and low satisfaction (Jap, 2003; Kaynak & Sert, 
2012). We call for further research on such intangible consequences, particularly for 
individuals.
Studies in business ethics may explore the consequences that pertain to legitimacy loss, 
legal costs, and marginalization by stakeholders. For example, accounting researchers may 
explore the extent to which partners’ unethical practices lead to a loss of credibility in the 
marketplace, thus reducing the likelihood of obtaining funding from banks or in extreme 
cases, having their operating licenses revoked by regulators. Intangible consequences bear 
severe implications for partners and the operation of the IOR. Supply chain scholars should 
explore the extent to which a buyer’s association with specific dark-side manifestations—
such as opportunism and fictitious accounting—might deter potential suppliers from enter-
ing a buyer-supplier agreement. Individuals who are found to engage in dark activities face 
stigmatization; consequently, their opportunities to find partners in the marketplace are 
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hampered (Bruyaka, Philippe, & Castañer, 2018). Other costs might entail additional 
“checks and balances” or less favorable trading conditions. General management studies 
might draw on behavioral approaches to examine the intangible consequences for manag-
ers, such as burnout, exhaustion, and stress experienced by individuals involved in various 
manifestations of the dark side of IORs (see Table 4).
Broadly, research that clarifies the link between specific manifestations and consequences 
of the dark side is greatly needed. Such research could help to minimize managers’ attribu-
tion errors. A buyer may make attributions about a supplier’s opportunism that are actually 
inaccurate, which may lead to the buyer’s managerial actions on the premise of the supplier’s 
opportunism. For example, Smith, Bolton, and Wagner (1999) stress that justice efforts in 
response to a service failure must match the type of service failure to be effective at restoring 
customer satisfaction. Future research will advance theory on how one party perceives the 
dark side and attributes the blame to the counterparty. Ill-informed decisions about dark-side 
manifestations might become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Ex Post Moderating Factors
Our review indicates that little attention has been paid to the buffering mechanisms of the 
dark side of IORs. In response to this shortcoming, we call for research on the specific buffer-
ing mechanisms of dark activities in different types of IORs (see Table 4).
General management has long been concerned with the performance implications of 
opportunism in alliances and buyer-supplier relationships. Management research would ben-
efit from studies that examine how third parties, such as trade associations, play a concilia-
tory role between the parties, thus weakening the impact of dark activities and their 
consequences for organizations. We have yet to learn about how, and under which conditions, 
third parties might operate as ex ante moderating factors, particularly with regard to the 
intangible consequences for organizations. Third parties may actively minimize partners’ 
reputation loss following unethical practices in an alliance by, for example, working closely 
with stakeholders. Business ethics research could help to develop theory about the processes 
and strategies by which third parties may avert stigmatization through, for example, the 
adoption of strategies of stakeholder engagement. Marketing studies might explore the mod-
erating factors of the relationship between dark-side manifestations and market reputation or 
brand value. From a supply chain management perspective, there is still limited knowledge 
about the role of boundary spanners in mitigating or exacerbating the consequences of the 
dark side in buyer-supplier relationships. We found no studies that examine managers’ psy-
chological traits or network position as potential moderators of the relationship between 
dark-side manifestations and their consequences. Furthermore, we envisage opportunities for 
accounting researchers to explore how control-related aspects regulating the activity of 
boundary spanners succeed or fail to operate as ex post moderators.
Further Directions for Research
Our review stresses the nuanced nature of dark activities in IORs. To advance theory on 
the dark side, we now present a research agenda on four interrelated issues: manifestation 
characteristics, entities and their motivations, temporality issues, and the bright side of the 
dark side.
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Manifestation Characteristics
Illegal vs immoral. Future research should study how issues of legality and morality—or 
a lack thereof—often present dilemmas. While some dark-side practices are immoral, they 
may be legal, or vice versa. For example, in an auditor-client relationship, an auditor can 
advise an alliance manager on deceitful strategies to reduce payable taxes. Tax reduction 
schemes may be legal, but they are perceived as immoral when they hamper the common 
good. We see many opportunities to examine the extent to which legal and moral aspects 
influence the persistence of particular manifestations of the dark side. Research that draws 
on business ethics (Schleper, Blome, & Wuttke, 2017) and accounting (Bayou et al., 2011), 
in particular, might be useful to advance theory on how managers navigate the illegal versus 
immoral tensions related to dark activities.
Covert vs overt. Manifestations of the dark side of IORs are often rooted in covert practices 
(Ermann & Lundman, 2002; Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010; Vaughan, 1985). Overt practices 
are less common and refer, for instance, to instances of open opportunism and disputes. The 
covert versus overt distinction has important implications for victims because it may influence 
their ability to discover that they are being affected by the detrimental actions of their part-
ner. Further research should examine whether the processes underlying the overt and covert 
manifestations of the dark side differ and if so, to what extent. An analysis of how institutional 
factors hinder or facilitate the development of covert versus overt manifestations of the dark 
side of IORs would be particularly interesting. It is plausible, for example, that specific organi-
zational contexts are more lenient to open dark-side manifestations, while other contexts, as a 
result of strict formal or informal rules, discourage any overt forms of the dark side.
Entities and Their Motivations
Multilateral vs unilateral. Dark-side manifestations may be initiated by individuals or an 
entire organization. For instance, Pinto, Leana, and Pil (2008) suggest a distinction between 
an organization of corrupt individuals and a corrupt organization. In the context of IORs, a 
corrupt individual might be a sales representative or purchasing manager, while a corrupt 
organization refers to, for example, a supplier or R&D consortium partner. This distinction 
between the different levels at which dark activities are organized remains to be explored by 
researchers.
We call for research that connects with the literature on organized crime, such as clandes-
tine groups, terrorist cells, gangs, mafia, cartels, and other dark networks (Bertrand, 
Lumineau, & Fedorova, 2014; Raab & Milward, 2003). This bridge among literature streams 
will help to advance theory on the use of unconventional modes of governance (e.g., pres-
sure, violence, or intimidation) when organizations cannot resort to a court of law (Bertrand 
& Lumineau, 2016). The literature on organized crime may be helpful to address the lack of 
research on the role of social conventions, individuals’ social identities, and reciprocity 
mechanisms that underpin the actions associated with dark-side manifestations by either a 
single individual or an organization.
Deceptive vs honest. An unanswered question concerning the dark side of IORs is whether 
and when perpetrators act in a deceptive manner or, instead, the dark side results from an 
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honest mistake. Much of the existing literature refers to deceitful behaviors intended to trick 
other parties. Managers often engage in passive forms of opportunism (Handley & Benton, 
2012), but these passive forms require further research on their determinants and moderating 
factors.
However, many instances of the dark side are plausibly honest mistakes. These mistakes 
largely occur as a result of individuals’ bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958), unaware-
ness of task interdependences in the IOR (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000), and organizational 
and technical complexity (Perrow, 1984). In the construction industry, for instance, cost 
overruns often stem from the project’s technical complexity rather than solely the main con-
tractor’s opportunistic behavior to extract rents from the client (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2017). 
Future research should examine the factors that contribute to deceitful and honest manifesta-
tions of the dark side between parties.
Accountability vs impunity. Common sense would suggest that dark-side manifestations 
are more likely to occur under conditions of low accountability and high impunity. However, 
research in sociology and accounting also shows a more nuanced role of control in driving 
the manifestations of the dark side (Gabbioneta, Greenwood, Mazzola, & Minoja, 2013). 
Institutional factors can actually conceal illegal actions or protect perpetrators. We envis-
age opportunities to examine which factors influence an organization’s tolerance of specific 
manifestations of the dark side. Organizations may enforce strict formal and informal regula-
tions, but future research should examine how such procedures might become a source of 
friction in the IOR.
Perpetrator vs victim. Our literature review reveals that we know little about the perpe-
trators’ motivations behind prevailing dark-side manifestations. Perpetrators can be moti-
vated by intrinsic (e.g., Machiavellian) motives or extrinsic rewards (e.g., job promotion). 
The motivation-opportunity-choice (MOC) model is helpful in understanding how actors’ 
motivations also interact with context, which makes feasible a possible course of action and 
the rationalization and justification used to legitimize involvement in dark-side activities. 
The MOC model posits that unfulfilled needs and deficiencies often arouse emotions and 
actions that contribute to specific manifestations of the dark side (McKendall & Wagner, 
1997; Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
At the same time, the victim’s perspective has received little attention within the literature 
on the dark side of IORs. This shortcoming is perplexing because the dark side of IORs is 
inherently a relational phenomenon that concerns at least two parties. We know little about 
who loses with dark activities in IORs. Future research should also examine to what extent 
perpetrators and victims differ in terms of individual (e.g., gender and religion) and organi-
zational (e.g., firm size and firm age) characteristics. We suggest that further attention should 
be paid to the strategies and paradoxes that surround the interactions between perpetrator and 
victim organizations of the dark side of IORs.
Speed and Timing
Fast vs slow. We still know little about the speed of the manifestation of the dark side 
in IORs. For example, some opportunistic behaviors manifest quickly when a supplier 
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knowingly sells a faulty component, while other opportunistic behaviors happen in slow 
motion and may be more pernicious, such as a partner’s ongoing activities to undermine its 
counterparty. Further research should examine the characteristics that influence the speed 
of the manifestation. What dark-side manifestations occur quickly versus slowly? How 
does the perpetrator versus the victim perceive the speed of the dark-side manifestation? 
We also call for studies on how speed interacts with intensity regarding how victims and 
perpetrators experience dark-side manifestations.
Early vs late. The timing of the manifestation of the dark side of IORs remains largely 
unexplored in the current literature. Drawing on the related research (e.g., trust repair; 
Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2017; MacDuffie, 2011), the timing of events is a nontrivial aspect 
of the consequences of the dark side of IORs. Lewicki and Brinsfield (2017) argue that trust 
violations are particularly damaging at the beginning of a relationship because the victim 
feels a particularly great sense of betrayal. We call for future research that examines whether 
the timing of the manifestation influences the attitudes and behaviors of perpetrators and 
victims in IORs and, in turn, the chances of success of specific remedying strategies.
Positive Outcomes: The Bright Side of the Dark Side
Operational vs strategic. By definition, the research has emphasized the negative aspects 
of the dark side. However, direct or indirect experience with dark activities can yield ben-
efits for an organization’s daily management activities (i.e., operational aspect) and vision 
and long-term plans (i.e., strategic aspect). Experience with dark-side manifestations may 
change how organizations link operational and strategic activities to succeed in the market. 
For instance, conflict may add clarity with regard to the features of a managerial problem, 
which is particularly relevant to innovation and development efforts in IORs. Future research 
should examine how victims, but also perpetrators, adapt their operational procedures on the 
basis of their experiences with the dark side of IORs. We call for theory development about 
how organizations sustain change aimed at preventing dark-side manifestations in future 
IORs. We encourage future research into how experiences of the dark side enter the orga-
nizational strategic decision-making process. To what extent do managers’ experiences of 
the dark side influence their propensity to take risks or to engage in cooperative strategies? 
Research on the benefits of dark activities will contribute to understanding how managers 
integrate operational and strategic objectives, thus providing useful insights for designing 
successful IORs.
Learning vs forgetting. Organizations can learn how to contract in IORs to mitigate the 
risk of the dark side by, for example, adding more details to future contracts (Mayer & 
Argyres, 2004). IOR scholars should further examine how organizations can promote learn-
ing among members through the development of training programs concerning specific man-
ifestations of the dark side.
Furthermore, we call for future research that examines the dynamics of learning and forget-
ting about the dark side of IORs (Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 1990; Benkard, 2000; March, 
1991). Organizational forgetting refers to the depreciation of organizational knowledge over 
time. Future research should examine which characteristics of the manifestation precipitate 
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forgetting about the dark side of IORs. This bridge between the literature on the dark side and 
organizational learning is important for understanding which firms, both as perpetrators and 
as victims, are able to learn from the dark side. It might be that some organizations develop 
capabilities to organize the dark side in an efficient way (Zyglidopoulos, Hirsch, Martin de 
Holan, & Phillips, 2017). They might, for instance, progressively learn and improve their 
skills in such a way that they know whom to target, with whom to collaborate, what is the best 
timing, or how not to be caught by their partner and enforcement authorities.
Managerial Implications
Our review sheds light on a number of prevention and mitigating strategies both for 
potential victims and for potential perpetrators. Firms may prevent the dark side in IORs by 
investing in screening of their potential business partners and may devote resources to 
develop relational norms with their current partners. Firms should also devise policies, pro-
cedures, codes of conduct, and training programs to prevent the different manifestations of 
the dark side.
As for mitigating strategies, managers may use formal and informal channels to allow 
employees to blow the whistle about ongoing individual or organizational dark practices. We 
suggest that a firm’s support of whistleblowers prevents the diffusion of dark-side manifesta-
tions as well as escalation of their consequences for partners and the IOR. Internal and exter-
nal communication channels play an important role in framing dark-side manifestations in a 
way that facilitates intervention and minimizes their consequences. In particular, in the short 
term, firms should learn to identify the type and intensity of the dark side and, in turn, adjust 
their reaction strategy to display different levels of forgetfulness toward their partner. In the 
longer term, firms should devote efforts to learn from dark events in order to minimize their 
reoccurrence.
Ultimately, managers should lead by example by setting high standards for themselves. 
Principled management is pivotal in curbing manifestations of the dark side in any type of 
IORs.
Conclusion
We reviewed the literature on the dark side of IORs published across management fields 
(1943–2017). Having identified the main manifestations of the dark side, we reviewed its 
antecedents, consequences, and ex ante and ex post moderating factors rooted in multiple 
levels of analysis. We not only discussed actionable research steps aimed at addressing lacu-
nae in the current knowledge but also presented a research agenda to advance the theory on 
the dark side of IORs. We hope that our review stimulates future research projects on the dark 
side of IORs. Our understanding of IORs is incomplete without generative knowledge about 
their dark side.
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